This study examines auditor sharing by mutual fund trusts (collections of mutual funds) and parents (administrators of fund operations). We examine the determinants of auditor sharing and whether an association exists between trust audit fees and auditor sharing. Employing a sample of 2,369 trust-year observations during 2005-2010, we find that auditor sharing is positively associated with proxies for parent accounting capabilities, trustee fund ownership, and the presence of trustees who are retired or former employees of the parent. Conversely, auditor sharing is less likely for trusts with larger boards, longer-tenured trustees, and longer auditor tenure. We find that trusts with shared auditors pay higher audit fees, suggesting either a premium for shared auditors' specialized knowledge or additional audit effort to compensate for shareholders' concerns about trustees' monitoring. Our findings offer insights into the audits of mutual funds and have implications for trustees as they consider auditor appointments.
Introduction
We exploit the unique organizational structure of the U.S. mutual fund industry to examine auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent. Mutual fund trusts (hereafter "trusts") are registered investment companies that represent a collection of mutual funds. Trusts and their mutual funds usually have no employees (Johnson 2009) , and all business functions are outsourced to service providers (Tufano and Sevick 1997) . A trust's board of trustees 1 typically contracts with the parent 2 (e.g., Fidelity, Dreyfus) that initially funded and organized the mutual funds for investment advice and fund administration, including accounting services (Deli 2002) .
As the fund accountant, the parent prepares mutual fund financial statements and files them with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Despite parent involvement in day-to-day fund operations and mutual fund names that imply parent ownership (e.g., Fidelity Large Cap Stock Fund, Dreyfus Equity Income Fund), a trust is a separate legal entity from its parent. As such, the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires that each board of trustees retains an external auditor to audit the annual financial statements of each mutual fund within the trust. A board may or may not choose to retain the parent's external auditor (i.e., auditor sharing), and we examine both the determinants of auditor sharing in the mutual fund industry and whether auditor sharing is associated with trust audit fees.
There are compelling reasons to examine auditor sharing in the mutual fund industry and its implications for audit fees. First, the depth and breadth of the U.S. mutual fund industry is substantial. Mutual funds held over $15 trillion in cash, stocks, bonds, and other marketable 1 Mutual funds organized as corporations call their board members "directors" while mutual funds organized as trusts call their board members "trustees." We use these terms interchangeably throughout the paper. 2 Parent firms are typically large financial service companies with several subsidiaries, and either or one of its subsidiaries is often retained by a trust to handle mutual fund operations. Throughout the paper, we use the term "parent" to refer to the parent firm as well as its subsidiaries.
securities at the end of 2014 and were owned by an estimated 90.4 million investors (43.3 percent of all U.S. households). The prevalence of mutual funds makes them extremely important to U.S.
capital markets and their participants, yet the industry has garnered little or no interest to date from accounting researchers. 3 We seek to fill this void.
Second, important differences exist between auditor sharing arrangements in the mutual fund industry and other settings. Recent studies have examined auditor sharing by firms with board interlocks (Brown and Drake 2014), firms within the same supply chain (Johnstone, Li, and Luo 2014) , and target firms and their acquirers (Cai, Kim, Park, and White 2015; Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland 2015) . In each of these studies, the sample firms operate independently from the other entity with which they share an auditor. In contrast, parents handle most of the day-to-day operations, including accounting, at a trust which could result in audit engagement synergies when a shared auditor is retained. Additionally, it is likely that a trust's board specifically considers whether it wants to share an auditor with the parent because of the close connection between trusts and parents. In fact, the Mutual Fund Directors Forum (2012) notes that some trusts intentionally retain an auditor that is different from the parent auditor.
Thus, we contribute to the literature by examining auditor sharing in a setting where (1) audit engagement synergies could impact audit fees and (2) it is informative to examine the determinants of auditor sharing.
We begin by examining the determinants of auditor sharing because little is known about auditor choice for mutual funds. 4 Prior studies find that auditor choice in other industries is associated with agency costs, corporate governance, and risk and complexity of operations (e.g., Francis and Wilson 1988; Beasley and Petroni 2001; Godfrey and Hamilton 2005) . Consistent with agency theory, we expect that auditor sharing is more likely when parent accounting capabilities are high (e.g., agency costs are low). 5 We do not predict the direction of the association between auditor sharing and corporate governance, trust risk, or trust complexity measures because arguments exist for both positive and negative associations, as discussed extensively in the next section. We also expect that a trust's auditor choice is associated with other auditor characteristics beyond whether or not the auditor is engaged by the parent.
Specifically, we expect that auditor sharing is less likely when the trust has a long-standing relationship with its auditor.
We then examine whether auditor sharing is associated with trust audit fees. The close connection between parents and trusts (e.g., parents perform the accounting function for trusts, non-independent trustees are typically employees of parent-related entities) creates opportunities for audit engagement synergies when the parent and trust share the same auditor. Such synergies could improve audit efficiency and reduce audit effort. This line of reasoning suggests that audit fees are lower for trusts that share an auditor with their parent. However, audit fees may be higher for trusts with shared auditors if (1) shared auditors charge an audit fee premium for their specialized knowledge about parent and trust or (2) trustees demand more auditing effort from shared auditors to address concerns that auditor sharing is perceived as ineffective monitoring.
Due to these competing possibilities, we do not predict the direction of the association between trust audit fees and auditor sharing.
In order to examine our research questions, we identify a sample of U.S. mutual fund trusts that contains 2,369 trust-year observations for 459 trusts managed by the 70 publicly traded 5 We use four proxies for parent accounting capabilities, including measures of parent experience with mutual fund accounting, parent restatements, parent unexplained audit fees, and parent auditor tenure.
mutual fund parents during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . Our dataset is representative of the U.S. mutual fund industry as the total average annual market value of the approximately 2,700 funds in these trusts is about $4 trillion. Since mutual funds within a trust are monitored by a single board of trustees that typically chooses an auditor at the trust level, we examine auditor sharing by trusts (and not funds) to avoid overstating our findings. We define auditor sharing as a parent and trust sharing the same auditor at the city level (as opposed to the national level) since this creates the greatest opportunities for audit efficiencies. In our sample, 17 percent of the trust-year observations share the same city-level auditor with their parents.
We examine the incidence of auditor sharing with a logistic regression model. Consistent with our expectations, we find that auditor sharing is more likely for trusts whose parents exhibit high accounting capabilities (i.e., more experience with mutual fund accounting, smaller unexplained audit fees, longer parent auditor tenure). We also find that auditor sharing is more likely when trustees are retired, former employees of the parent, or have large ownership in the trust's funds, but auditor sharing is less likely for trusts with larger boards and longer tenured trustees. Our findings regarding trust risk and complexity are mixed with some measures suggesting that auditor sharing is more likely for risky and complex trusts while other measures suggest that auditor sharing is less likely for risky and complex trusts. Finally, we find some evidence that auditor sharing is less likely if the trust has longer auditor tenure.
Next, we examine the association between trust audit fees and auditor sharing with a regression model where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual trust audit fees and independent variables include a shared auditor indicator and control variables motivated by prior studies of audit fees (e.g., Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006) or mutual funds (e.g., Tufano and Sevick 1997; Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch 2003) . We find a positive and significant association between trust audit fees and auditor sharing, which is robust to controlling for potential endogeneity in auditor choice. Our finding suggests that, on average, additional audit fees charged to trusts with shared auditors are not completely offset by benefits resulting from audit synergies and efficiencies that occur when trusts and parents retain the same auditor. In addition, our finding differs from Johnstone et al. (2014) who report lower audit fees for supplier companies that retain an auditor with city-level supply chain knowledge (shared auditor), which indicates that the implications of auditor sharing arrangements differ across industries.
Our study makes two key contributions that are valuable to accounting researchers, regulators, investment companies, and investors. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the audit environment of U.S. mutual funds. Developing an understanding of this audit environment is important because nearly one in two households invest in mutual funds, and mutual funds are important to the U.S. capital markets. Second, we provide insights into the determinants of auditor sharing for mutual fund trusts and evidence that audit fees are higher for trusts that share an external auditor with their parent compared to trusts that do not share auditors with their parents. These findings contribute to the auditor sharing literature and have implications for mutual fund boards as they consider auditor appointments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical models and a description of our sample.
Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes.
Background and Hypothesis Development
The Mutual Fund Industry
Organizational, Governance, and Regulatory Structures
The vast majority of U.S. investment companies are mutual funds. Mutual funds are typically organized as either corporations or trusts and issue redeemable shares that can be bought or sold at their current net asset value (NAV). Investors in mutual fund shares have specific voting rights, including the rights to elect boards of trustees and approve fundamental changes to fund policies and investment objectives. funds often form registration companies (commonly referred to as trusts) to mitigate board, fund startup, regulatory, and disclosure costs (Schonfeld and Kerwin 1993) . For example, a parent might organize equity funds into one trust, fixed income funds into another, and all funds within a trust might have common prospectus and annual report filings.
The parent is initially the sole shareholder, and it appoints the first board of trustees. The SEC mandates that at least 40 percent of trustees are independent (i.e., unaffiliated, disinterested, or outsider), although the parent and independent trustees are often connected through business interactions (Kuhnen 2009 ). The Investment Company Act of 1940 charges independent trustees with protecting mutual fund investors from conflicts of interest resulting from the divergence of parent and investor incentives (Freeman and Brown 2001) . Non-independent trustees on the board are typically employees of the parent or one of its subsidiaries (Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa 2010) .
Unlike corporations in other industries, mutual funds are externally managed and usually have no employees (Johnson 2009 ). Instead, necessary services are provided on a contract basis and renegotiated annually by the mutual fund board (Tufano and Sevick 1997 
Accounting and Auditing Environment
Mutual funds are subject to numerous disclosure requirements. 10 The requires that a majority of the trust's independent trustees approve the auditor selection at an annual in-person meeting. 11 A potential consideration for the trustees is whether to retain the same auditor as the parent. Recent evidence suggests that some trusts have intentionally chosen not to 9 See Tufano and Sevick (1997) for a more complete discussion of the differences and similarities of mutual fund and corporate boards. 10 In the interest of brevity, we only list some of the disclosure requirements for mutual funds. 11 The auditor selection must also be ratified by the shareholders unless the selection is approved by an audit committee consisting only of independent trustees. 
Auditor Sharing
Auditor sharing occurs if two entities retain the same external auditor. One line of research examines auditor sharing by entities that are not part of a group for financial reporting purposes and receive separate, stand-alone audit opinions (e.g., Brown and Drake 2014; Johnstone, et al. 2014) . Another line of research examines the lack of auditor sharing for components of a group that receive a group audit opinion (e.g., Dee, Lulseged, and Zhang 2012; Carson, Simnett, Trompeter, and Vanstraelen 2014) . 12 Auditor sharing in the mutual fund industry is similar to the former, and we focus our discussion on that area of research.
Collectively, prior studies of auditor sharing in non-group audit settings suggest that firms benefit from retaining a shared auditor. Brown and Drake (2014) examine tax implications of network ties (proxied for with board interlocks) and find that tax avoidance is greater for firms 12 In a group audit, the financial statements of more than one component (e.g., entity and subsidiary) are audited (by one auditor or multiple auditors) and consolidated for financial reporting purposes. One audit opinion is issued for the group. In contrast, the financial statements of mutual funds and their parents are not consolidated, and separate stand-alone audit opinions are issued for each mutual fund and parent.
with both board interlocks and shared auditors. Two recent studies examine auditor sharing by target and acquirer firms in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. Cai et al. (2015) report that the combined M&A announcement return is significantly higher for firms with a shared auditor and find evidence that shared auditors reduce M&A uncertainty. Meanwhile, Dhaliwal et al. (2015) find that a shared auditor primarily benefits the acquiring firm in the form of higher acquirer announcement returns, lower deal premiums, and higher deal completion rates. Johnstone et al. (2014) study auditor sharing by suppliers and customers within a supply chain.
They find that auditor sharing at the city level is associated with higher audit quality and lower audit fees for supplier companies.
The mutual fund industry offers a unique setting to further examine auditor sharing.
First, it is quite likely that trustees consider whether they want to retain the parent's auditor because of the close connection between trusts and parents. In fact, the Mutual Fund Directors Forum (2012) states that some trusts intentionally retain an auditor that is different from the parent's auditor. Since we examine auditor sharing in a setting where auditor sharing is unlikely to be arbitrary, we can provide evidence on the determinants of auditor sharing -a topic that has been unexplored in prior studies.
A second advantage of examining auditor sharing in the mutual fund industry is that the parent (or its subsidiary) performs the accounting function for the trust. Thus, auditor sharing in the mutual fund industry creates an opportunity for two different types of audit synergies: (1) synergies that can arise from one auditor auditing the parent and the trust, and (2) synergies that can arise from the parent performing the accounting function for itself and the trust. Thus, the unique nature of the mutual fund industry provides a powerful setting to detect whether the benefits of audit synergies (i.e., reduced audit effort) that are possible with auditor sharing are passed on to trusts in the form of lower audit fees.
Hypothesis Development

Auditor Choice
An extensive literature on auditor choice examines clients' demand for audit quality, typically proxied for with auditor size and industry specialization (DeFond and Zhang 2014). In general, the literature suggests that high quality auditors are more likely to be retained by firms with higher agency costs (e.g. , differs between shared and non-shared auditors, we expect the factors which were associated with auditor choice in other studies will also influence auditor choice in the mutual fund industry.
Specifically, we expect agency costs, corporate governance, risk and complexity of operations, and auditor characteristics to be associated with a trust's choice to retain the same auditor as its parent.
Boards of trustees typically employ the parent firm as an "agent" to manage a mutual fund's day-to-day operations. As previously discussed, the parent provides both investment advice and fund administration (including accounting services) to the trust. We expect that the accounting capabilities exhibited by the parent influence whether or not the board of trustees chooses to share auditors with the parent. For example, we expect that trustees consider the quality of accounting exhibited by the parent as well as the extent of the parent's mutual fund accounting experience when deciding whether or not to share the parent's auditor. When the parent's accounting capabilities are high, fewer agency conflicts should exist and we predict that the board of trustees will retain the parent's auditor because of confidence in the parent's accounting choices (including auditor selection) and little concern about agency conflicts.
Alternatively, if the parent exhibits weak or limited accounting capabilities, we predict that the board of trustees will retain an auditor that is different from the parent's auditor in order to provide added assurance to shareholders that the financial statements of each mutual fund are fairly presented. 13 Both predictions are consistent with agency theory and the expectation that auditor choice is associated with agency costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1983) . Our first hypothesis, presented in the alternative form, is as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1a. Auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent is more likely when the parent exhibits strong accounting capabilities.
Corporate governance has been found to be a determinant of auditor choice in other settings (e.g., Beasley and Petroni 2001; Cassell et al. 2012 ), and we expect that board and trustee characteristics influence whether or not the mutual fund's board of trustees chooses to share auditors with the parent. The mutual fund literature has examined a few monitoring choices by boards of trustees and documented links between these monitoring choices and trustee characteristics. Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Adams et al. (2010) find an inverse relation between board of trustee independence and fund expenses, suggesting that independent trustees do a better job of negotiating with service providers. 14 Fama and Jensen (1983) note that independent mutual fund trustees have career incentives to signal their willingness to promote shareholder interests and resist colluding with fund managers. Auditor choice is one signaling mechanism trustees could use to convey their value as independent monitors. Little else is known about whether trustees' monitoring choices are influenced by other board and trustee characteristics.
15
13 When a trust has a parent with weak accounting capabilities, the other alternative is for the trust to change fund administrators. However, this action is extremely costly for trusts and a rare occurrence. 14 Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) note that boards of trustees have a fiduciary duty to ensure that the fees they negotiate reflect value for fund investors. 15 Beyond monitoring choices, studies have also examined whether trustee characteristics are associated with other trust and mutual fund characteristics. For example, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008) and Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, Weinbaum (2009) find that director ownership in the funds they oversee is associated with improved shareholder value. Meanwhile, Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2007) and Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2014) find highly paid trustees are associated with conflicts in parent and fund shareholder interests.
As discussed in detail in Section 3, we examine the association between auditor choice and a variety of board and trustee characteristics. However, we do not make directional predictions about any of the specific trustee characteristics as this part of our analysis is exploratory in nature. Our second hypothesis, presented in the null form, is as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1b. Auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent is not associated with board and trustee characteristics.
Prior research suggests that auditor choice in other settings is associated with proxies for firm risk and complexity (e.g., Francis et al. 1999; Copley and Douthett 2002; Godfrey and Hamilton 2005) . Specifically, riskier and complex firms are more likely to retain high quality auditors (e.g., Big N, industry specialist). With regard to auditor sharing in the mutual fund industry, it is unclear ex ante if riskier or complex trusts choose to retain a shared auditor or not.
On one hand, a shared auditor allows a trust to capitalize on any accounting and audit synergies that exist between the trust and its parent, which could benefit risky or complex trusts that naturally require more involved audits. On the other hand, risky or complex trusts may prefer to retain a different auditor from the parent in order to provide added assurance to shareholders of appropriate financial reporting oversight. Due to these conflicting viewpoints, we refrain from making a directional prediction about the association between auditor sharing and trust riskiness and complexity. Our third hypothesis, presented in the null form, is as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1c. Auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent is not associated with trust risk and complexity.
Finally, we expect that trusts are less likely to retain a shared auditor if they already have a long-standing audit relationship. A long-standing audit relationship suggests that the trust's auditor has specialized knowledge of the mutual funds being audited as well as accounting work performed by the parent, and the benefits of retaining a shared auditor may be minimal. In fact, a long-standing auditor with a history of interactions with both the parent and the trust may act as a substitute for a shared auditor. Our final hypothesis related to auditor choice, presented in the alternative form, are as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1d. Auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent is less likely when the trust has a long-standing relationship with its auditor.
Audit Fees
We next question whether there are any implications of auditor sharing for a trust. Johnstone et al. (2014) find that auditor sharing within a supply chain is associated with higher audit quality as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, lower incidence of restatements, and lower likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. An examination of audit quality in the mutual fund industry is more challenging since traditional audit quality measures are not all applicable. For example, standard discretionary accruals models (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005) are created with industrial and not financial service firms in mind, and analyst forecasts do not exist for mutual funds. Restatements and going concern opinions do exist for trusts, but our review of Audit Analytics suggests that these outcomes are very rare in the mutual fund industry regardless of the auditor retained. 16 Johnstone et al. (2014) also examine the audit pricing implications of auditor sharing and find that audit fees are significantly lower for firms with shared supply chain auditors. Whether auditor sharing has implications for trust audit fees is an empirical question.
A large body of research examines the determinants of audit fees for companies in a broad range of industries. This literature consistently finds strong evidence that audit fees are associated with measures of risk including client size, client complexity, and inherent risk of 16 Our review of audit opinions in Audit Analytics indicates that from 2005-2010 (our sample period), 0.2 percent of mutual fund trusts received going concern audit opinions while 23.3 percent of audit opinions for all other firms were going concern opinions. In addition, 0.6 (9.3) percent of trusts (all other firms) reported a restatement. The low incidence of trust restatements may be due to the regulated nature of this industry. Another possible explanation is that unique characteristics of trusts (e.g., no employees) reduces the risk of certain types of restatements experienced by other companies (e.g., revenue/earnings manipulation, stock option backdating).
difficult-to-audit accounts (see Hay et al. 2006) . Audit fee studies specific to financial service companies (i.e., banks, insurance) use industry-specific risk measures in their audit fee models and draw similar inferences (e.g., Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Fields, Fraser, and Wilkins 2004; Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, and Lobo 2010) . Prior studies also suggest that audit fees are associated with characteristics of the auditor such as size and industry specialization (see Hay et al. 2006 ).
Auditor sharing may reduce trust audit fees. Trusts are closely connected to their parents because parent entities perform fund advisory and administrative services for the trust and nonindependent board members are typically employees of the parent or its subsidiaries. When the parent and trust share the same auditor, the close relationships between parents and trusts can lead to audit synergies and audit efficiencies that reduce required audit effort and, in turn, reduce the trust's audit fees. However, evidence in the literature regarding the effects of audit synergies or efficiencies on audit fees is mixed (e.g., Gist 1994; Dopuch, Gupta, Simunic, and Stein 2003; Knechel, Rouse, and Schellerman 2009 ).
On the other hand, auditor sharing could result in increased trust audit fees. Since a shared auditor has specialized knowledge about both parent and trust (which could improve the audit process), the auditor may be able to extract an audit fee premium. Similar arguments related to audit quality and monopoly pricing are discussed in studies that examine auditor size and audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986 ). Alternatively, trustees may be concerned that shareholders will perceive use of a shared auditor as both lack of auditor independence and ineffective monitoring by the trustees (Mutual Fund Directors Forum 2012) . In these instances, trustees may demand extra auditing effort from shared auditors, resulting in higher audit fees.
Our audit fee hypothesis is presented in the null form:
HYPOTHESIS 2. Trust audit fees are not associated with auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent.
Empirical Models and Data
Empirical Models
Determinants of Auditor Sharing
We conduct multivariate analysis to examine the determinants of trust auditor choice by applying the following logistic regression model. That is
where the dependent variable is Shared Auditor, an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the parent and trust share the same practice office of an audit firm (i.e., city-level auditor sharing), and zero otherwise. We measure auditor sharing at the city-level instead of the nationallevel since the greatest opportunity for synergies should exist if a trust and parent engage in citylevel auditor sharing, and a city-level auditor sharing measure is consistent with Brown and Drake (2014), Johnstone et al. (2014) , and Dhaliwal et al. (2015) .
Parent Accounting Capabilities includes four proxies which we use to examine whether trusts are more likely to engage in auditor sharing when the parent exhibits strong accounting capabilities (Hypothesis 1a). Family TNA equals the sum of all mutual fund trust assets managed by the parent and provides an indication of parent experience with mutual fund accounting.
Parent Restatement is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the parent restated its financial statements in either of the two prior years. Parent UAF is a measure of the parent's unexplained audit fees, and Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson (2014) argue that larger unexplained audit fees are a signal for low accounting quality. We calculate Parent UAF as the residual obtained from regressing the natural logarithm of parent audit fees on numerous determinants of parent audit fees. 17 To ease interpretation we multiply the regression residual by minus one so that 17 Our approach is based on Hribar et al. (2014) and adjusted for our setting. Because parent firms are primarily in the banking, insurance, and financial services industries, many of the audit fee Hay et al. 2006) and two audit fee studies specific to financial service companies (Fields et al. 2004; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010 ) to develop our parent audit fee model. Our determinants of parent audit fees include the following variables, all defined in 18 Under these regulations, an outsider is a trustee who is not an employee, not an employee family member, a trustee who is not an employee or a 5 percent shareholder of a registered broker-dealer, or a trustee who does not have any affiliation with any recent legal counsel to the fund. We rely on an indicator of all independent trustees instead of the proportion of independent trustees since most boards during our sample period fall into two groups, ones that have only one insider trustee (typically an officer of the parent) and ones that have no insider trustees (i.e., all independent trustees). As such, the proportion of independent directors is affected by board size and its use in industries, and we rely on prior mutual fund studies to identify proxies for trust complexity and risk (e.g., Tufano and Sevick 1997; Del Guercio et al. 2003; Cremers et al. 2009 ). Our first trust complexity and audit risk measure is Trust TNA, a measure of trust size, which equals the natural logarithm of the summation of total net assets (TNA) of all funds in a trust. We include trust size since large trusts are likely to be more complex and have more inherent risk than small trusts. We include Mean Trust Advisor Fees, which is the net asset value weighted average of the percentage of assets that are paid to the corporate parent for providing management (including accounting) regressions contributes to multicollinearity concerns since board size and proportion of independent trustees are correlated. 19 In unreported analysis we consider other reported ownership levels and find that using alternative ownership levels does not change our results in a meaningful way.
and administrative services for all funds in a trust, and captures the overall level of services provided to funds by parents.
All of the funds in a trust typically have the same fiscal year end date. However, some trusts have funds with multiple fiscal year-end dates to alleviate reporting and filing bottlenecks common in larger and more complex trusts. We count the number of fiscal year ends for each trust as an additional complexity measure (Number of Fiscal Year Ends). We also include the 
Mutual Fund Trust Audit Fees and Auditor Sharing
We provide multivariate cross-sectional analysis to examine the relationship between mutual fund trust audit fees and auditor sharing with the parent (Hypothesis 2), while controlling for other auditor and trust characteristics. The primary specification of our regression model is
Trust Audit Feesi,t = 0 + β1-4 (Auditor Characteristicsi,t ) + β5-13 (Trust Characteristicsi,t ) + β14 Inverse Mills Ratio
where Trust Audit Fees are the natural logarithm of annual trust-level audit fees. Auditor Characteristics include the auditor characteristics shown in Model 1 as well as Shared Auditor, which is previously defined, and Specialist. Our main variable of interest is Shared Auditor, and we do not make a signed prediction for the coefficient since Hypothesis 2 is presented in the null form. We include Specialist 20 as a proxy for audit quality since prior research suggests that audit quality is a determinant of audit fees (Hay et al. 2006) . Specifically, Specialist is defined as an 20 Another common proxy for auditor quality is an indicator variable representing auditor size (DeFond and Zhang 2014). However, since than less one percent of our overall sample employs non-Big 4 auditors, we refrain from including a Big 4 measure in Model 1. Later in this section, we discuss the results of a sensitivity test where a Big 4 auditor indicator is included in the model. indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the trust retains the auditor with (1) the highest market share in the mutual fund industry during the year, and (2) the market share is at least 10 percentage points higher than the next closest auditor, and zero otherwise. 21 Extrapolating the approach of Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) to mutual fund trusts, we calculate an auditor's market share as the square root of the net asset value of the auditor's clients scaled by the square root of the net asset value of all audit clients in the mutual fund industry.
Trust Characteristics includes all of the trust characteristics shown in Model 1 as well as One advantage to using trusts to examine audit fees is they mitigate endogeneity concerns about the auditor choice and audit fee relationship. Unlike companies in other industries, where firms might self-select based on firm characteristics, trusts are often comprised of many funds so self-selection by individual funds is less likely. Nevertheless, we estimate an alternate specification of Model 2 using the Heckman (1979) 
Sample
We use four primary databases to construct our sample: Morningstar Direct, Audit
Analytics, Compustat, and SEC's EDGAR. Morningstar Direct contains monthly mutual fund class level returns and yearly mutual fund information including total net assets, advisor fees, fund age, purchase constraints (e.g., institutional share classes), historical returns, and trust level information. Morningstar Direct also identifies the corporate parents that sponsor the funds and the trust to which the mutual fund belongs. 22 We gather auditor name and office location, audit fees, and non-audit fees for trusts and publicly traded parents from Audit Analytics. In addition,
we compute auditor tenure using data from Audit Analytics. We obtain parent financial and We limit hand collection costs for the board of trustee data by gathering data for about 85 percent of the trusts in the sample. The resulting board of trustee subsample contains 2,019 trust-year observations from 393 trusts over the same time period as the overall sample. 
Descriptive Statistics
Trust Level
Board of Trustees Data
Panel B of Table 2 
Parent Level Descriptive Statistics
Multivariate Analysis
Since trusts often use the same auditors for several years and audit fees usually change only moderately from year to year, it is possible that our panel dataset may be correlated across trusts and time. This can bias standard errors upwards or downwards depending on the nature of the correlations. We address the potential bias in the standard errors by estimating our models with heteroskedastic robust clustered standard errors as in Petersen (2009) and year fixed effects. We cluster at the trust level because all funds within a trust have the same board of trustees and it is the trustees that make the auditor choice. However, as Donald and Lang (2007) note, this methodology can be problematic when the number of observations per cluster is small. Since our dataset is limited to six annual observations per trust (i.e., the number of years in our sample period), we repeat the analysis using robust (non-clustered) standard errors. Although not reported, the coefficients that are significant with clustered standard errors remain significant when we use non-clustered standard errors. Employee in a single specification increases multicollinearity concerns and makes interpretation of estimated coefficients difficult.
Determinants of Auditor Sharing by Mutual Fund Trusts
Across all three columns, we find that three of the four parent accounting capabilities measures are significantly associated with auditor sharing as predicted by Hypothesis 1a.
Specifically, Family TNA, Parent UAF, and Parent Auditor Tenure are all positively associated
with Shared Auditor at the 1 percent level. These findings support Hypothesis 1a and suggest that trusts are more likely to share an auditor with the parent when the parent exhibits high accounting quality and has more experience with mutual fund accounting. 23 On the other hand, when trustees observe low-quality accounting, they rely on external auditors that are not retained by their parents to provide assurance that mutual fund financial statements are fairly presented.
Turning to board characteristics, the data presented in Columns 2 and 3 indicate that five board characteristics are significant determinants of Shared Auditor. Specifically, a trust is less 23 Another possible explanation for our findings is that parents with more mutual fund assets under their management, smaller unexplained audit fees, and long-standing relationships with their auditors have more influence over the trust's auditor choice. Table 4 also provides mixed evidence regarding Hypothesis 1c, the expectation that auditor sharing is not associated with trust risk and complexity. Across all three model specifications, the results suggest that auditor sharing is more likely as Trust TNA Growth Rate increases. Auditor sharing is also more likely for trusts with Alternative Investment Funds, but only in the model specification that excludes board characteristics. In contrast, the specifications that include board characteristics (Columns 2 and 3) report that auditor sharing is less likely as
Mean Trust Advisor Fees and Number of Funds in Trust increase. Coefficients on the remaining
trust risk and complexity measures are insignificant. These findings suggest that certain trust characteristics are significantly associated with auditor sharing but the presence of both positive and negative coefficients makes it difficult to determine whether trusts with more risk and complexity are either more or less likely to share an auditor with the parent.
In terms of auditor characteristics, we find some evidence that auditor sharing is less likely for trusts that have long-standing relationships with their auditors. The estimated coefficient on Auditor Tenure is negative and significant in Column 3 and nearly significant in Column 2 (p = 0.109). The Non-Audit Fees coefficient is negative and nearly significant in Column 3 (p = 0.106). These results provide some support for Hypothesis 1d and suggest that auditors in established auditor-trust relationships (i.e., longer auditor tenure) have specialized knowledge of the mutual funds they audit and the parent's accounting services which limits the demand for a shared auditor.
Collectively, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that trusts with larger boards of trustees, longer tenured trustees, and longer auditor tenure are less likely to share auditors with the parent. On the other hand, trusts with parents exhibiting strong accounting capabilities and boards with higher concentrations of trustees who are retired, former employees of the parent, or have large ownership in the fund family are more likely to engage in auditor sharing. Overall, these findings indicate that several factors impact trust auditor choice. Table 5 presents results for two model specifications related to trust audit fees. Column 1 presents the estimated coefficients for the audit fee specification in Model 2. Column 2 reports the second stage OLS coefficient estimates for the Heckman (1979) 
24
Mutual Fund Trust Audit Fees and Auditor Sharing
selection model that includes
Inverse Mills Ratio as a control variable.
Across both columns, we find that the estimated coefficient on Shared Auditor is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). The estimated coefficient for Shared Auditor reported in the second stage OLS specification presented in Column 2 is similar in sign, magnitude, and 24 We considered examining which trust factors were associated with auditor switches to a shared auditor, but found that only one percent of the trust-year observations in our sample involved an auditor switch. Such a low incidence of auditor switching makes it difficult for us to obtain reliable inferences from an auditor switching analysis.
statistical significance to that reported in the primary specification (Column 1). 25 This is consistent with our argument that endogeneity concerns about the relationship between trust audit fees and auditor choice are minimal in mutual funds. Possible explanations for the positive association between trust audit fees and auditor sharing include: (1) shared auditors charge an audit fee premium for their specialized knowledge about both the trust and its parent, or (2) trustees demand additional audit effort from shared auditors in order to compensate for concerns about ineffective monitoring. Regardless of which explanation drives the association, the positive Shared Auditor coefficient suggests rejection of our null Hypothesis 2 which predicted no association between trust audit fees and auditor sharing. Our finding differs from Johnstone et al.
(2014) who report lower audit fees for supplier companies that retain an auditor with city-level supply chain knowledge (shared auditor). The difference in our findings could be due to industry differences between our studies or the fact that our definition of auditor sharing differs from how Johnstone et al. (2014) measure city-level supply chain knowledge. Table 5 reports that several control variables are also associated with trust audit fees in both specifications of Model 2. With respect to other auditor characteristics, audit fees are negatively associated with use of an industry specialist auditor which suggests that audit effort is lower for mutual fund industry specialist auditors. We also find a positive association between audit fees and non-audit fees, consistent with prior studies (Hay et al. 2006) . In terms of trust characteristics, both columns in Table 5 report positive and statistically significant coefficients for
Trust TNA and Number of Funds in Trust, suggesting that trust complexity increases audit effort, 25 In the Heckman (1979) first stage regression our exclusionary variable, Parent Auditor Tenure, is statistically significant (p < 0.01). In addition, the pseudo R 2 value for the full first stage specification is 15 percent and the partial R 2 (the pseudo R 2 of first stage without the exclusionary variables) is about 10 percent, which means the exclusionary variable significantly increases the explanatory ability of the model. The combination of the statistical significance of the exclusionary variable and its impact on model fit indicates that Parent Auditor Tenure satisfies the relevancy requirement for Heckman (1979) first stage exclusionary determinants. and thus audit fees. Meanwhile, we find a negative and significant coefficient for Family TNA.
This negative relationship between trust audit fees and family size suggests improved accounting quality in larger fund complexes and/or greater bargaining power for trusts of large fund families.
Overall, the results provided in Column 1 suggest that larger, more complex trusts pay higher audit fees, which is consistent with prior audit fee studies that have examined other industries (Hay et al. 2006) . Column 2 also reports a negative and statistically significant Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient suggesting there is some selection bias. However, the consistency of Shared Auditor in Column 1 and Column 2 suggests any selection bias does not materially affect the auditor choice and trust audit fee relation.
The adjusted R 2 for both specifications reported in Table 5 is around 47 percent, which is lower than what is typically reported for audit fee models. However, as previously discussed, prior audit fee studies have focused primarily on non-financial companies, and many non-financial company audit fee determinants are not applicable to trusts. The results presented in Table 5 also appear robust to multicollinearity concerns. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for Shared Auditor in the Column 1 specification is 1.10, which is very similar to the VIF of 1.14 reported in Column 2. In addition, the VIF in Column 2 for Inverse Mills Ratio is 3.64 and well below the cutoff of 10 commonly used to identify high multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980; Greene 2008) .
Sensitivity Tests
We conduct four sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, because audit effort may have changed for mutual funds during and after the recent financial crisis, we estimated our audit fee model separately for each year in lieu of including year fixed effects.
Untabulated results show that Shared Auditor is positively and significantly associated with trust audit fees in all years of our sample period.
Second, even though nearly all of our sample trusts retain a Big 4 auditor, we include a Big 4 auditor indicator in the audit fee models in order to separate the effects of auditor brand name from other auditor characteristics. Untabulated results indicate that the Big 4 auditor coefficient is insignificant in our re-estimations of Model 2, and inferences with respect to other variables of interest are unchanged from what we report in Table 5 .
Third, since the Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) approach to identifying auditor industry specialization is somewhat restrictive, we create two alternate measures of trust auditor industry specialization that follow Francis, Reichelt, and Wang (2005) . The first alternative is a nationallevel specialist indicator set to one if the auditor has the highest market share (in terms of audit fees) in the mutual fund industry, and zero otherwise. The second alternative is a city-level specialist indicator set to one if the auditor has the highest market share (in terms of audit fees) in the mutual fund industry for a particular city, and zero otherwise. Untabulated results for Table 5 are consistent with those reported in the paper regardless of which alternate industry specialization measure is used in our audit fee model.
Finally, we add industry specialist to the determinants model in order to control for any effect that auditor quality may have on auditor choice. 26 We separately estimate our three auditor sharing determinant specifications using the specialist measure based on Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) as well as the two alternative measures discussed in the previous paragraph. In all cases, the Specialist coefficient is insignificant in the auditor sharing determinants model.
Conclusion
This study examines auditor sharing by a mutual fund trust and its parent. Using a sample of 2,369 trust-year observations during 2005 to 2010 in the U.S., we examine both the determinants of auditor sharing and whether an association exists between trust audit fees and 26 We are unable to include the Big 4 indicator in the auditor sharing model due to lack of variability in Big 4 auditor status between trusts with and without shared auditors.
auditor sharing. We first predict that auditor sharing is more likely for trusts with parents that exhibit high accounting capabilities (e.g., experience with mutual fund accounting, unexplained parent audit fees, parent auditor tenure) and find evidence consistent with our prediction. We also examine whether auditor sharing is associated with board of trustee characteristics and find that many board characteristics are significant predictors of auditor sharing (e.g., board size, trustee tenure, trustee fund ownership). We find mixed evidence regarding the association between auditor sharing and trust risk and complexity, but we do find some evidence that auditor sharing is less likely for trusts with longer auditor tenure.
With respect to audit fees, we find strong evidence that trusts with a shared auditor pay significantly higher audit fees than trusts with non-shared auditors. We interpret this finding as evidence that either shared auditors charge a premium for their specialized knowledge about the trust and/or its parent or trustees demand additional audit effort from shared auditors in order to compensate for concerns about ineffective monitoring. The positive association also indicates that higher audit fees charged to trusts with shared auditors are not completely offset by benefits from audit synergies that occur when trusts and parents share the same auditor.
We contribute to the literature by providing the first evidence on the audit environment of U.S. mutual funds. We encourage researchers to explore other research questions involving the auditing and accounting practices of mutual funds since this industry is extremely important to both the U.S. economy and individual investors. We also encourage further research related to auditor sharing. While our findings are novel, they are specific to mutual funds and may not generalize to other industries or settings where auditor sharing arrangements occur. Indicator variable set to one if the auditor has the highest market share in the client's industry and the market share is at least 10 percentage points higher than the next closest auditor, and zero otherwise. For trusts, we calculate market share as the square root of TNA for the auditor's clients scaled by the square root of TNA for all auditors' clients.
Auditor Tenure Audit Analytics Log of the number of years the current auditor has been retained. 
Notes:
This table provides coefficient estimates from logistic regressions of shared auditor choice on parent accounting capabilities, board, trustee, auditor, and trust characteristics. The data covers the period from 2005 to 2010 for 459 trusts. Z-statistics derived from trust-level clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for indicator and logged variables. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1 . This table provides results from regressing the natural logarithm of trust audit fees on trust and auditor characteristics. All models include year fixed effects. T-statistics derived from trust-level clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for indicator and logged variables. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
